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1 Introduction
“How wonderful that we have met with a paradox.
Now we have some hope of making progress.”—Niels
Bohr [1]
The medical technology industry in the early twenty-first
century is marked by a puzzling paradox. The industry has
contributed to decades of life-saving innovations: the intro-
duction of technologies like the implantable cardioverter
defibrillator, radiofrequency catheter ablation for cardiac
arrhythmias, and cardiac resynchronization therapy, and
we have witnessed remarkable reductions in mortality and
morbidity due to cardiovascular disease [2, 3]. Nevertheless,
we are simultaneously witnessing escalating concerns from
politicians, the plaintiff’s bar, the general public, physicians,
researchers, and patients over whether our technologies
truly are safe and effective [4–6]. Behind this paradox lies
another, more subtle paradox: a vigorously innovative med-
ical technology industry requires strong and complex under-
pinnings, but there is a growing sense that overly
burdensome and complex regulations threaten to choke off
continued innovation. Our intent is to explore this paradox,
by expressing the authors opinions based on their medical
device industry viewpoint, focusing on three areas of con-
cern: the threat posed by a globally discordant patchwork of
different regulatory approaches and standards, the threat
posed by a particularly burdensome regulatory process with-
in the USA, and the implications of inappropriate use of
comparative effectiveness with respect to medical devices.
2 The global environment for innovation: regulatory
discord or harmony
The requirements to introduce new medical devices can vary
dramatically around the world. For example—consider the
differences between the USA and the European Union. In
the USA, the foundations of the regulatory requirements for
medical products are defined statutorily in the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act and implemented in the Code of
Federal Regulations [7]. Per this construct, higher risk devices
(e.g., U.S. Class II and Class III) may only enter the US
market after they have been demonstrated to provide a rea-
sonable assurance of safety and effectiveness for the intended
use in the labeled intended patient population. In contrast,
under the European regulatory framework, manufacturers
must establish the safety and performance of the proposed
device—a subtly different standard (Council Directive
93/42/EEC) [8]. Furthermore, despite the similarity in the
nomenclatures used for classification in the USA and the
EU, the criteria used to classify, and thus identify those devi-
ces which must meet higher premarket thresholds, are quite
different in these two regions. The net result of both these
factors can be dramatically different requirements to place
new medical technologies into the market for use with
patients. There are two very different (and valid) perspectives
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on this consequence—either that the patients in the region for
which the regulatory requirements were lower (typically the
EU) are benefitting from earlier access to new lifesaving
technologies or that the patients in the region for which the
requirements were higher are benefitting from access to tech-
nologies that have been more thoroughly vetted and—by
extension—are either safer or more effective [9]. There are
oft-cited examples to support either perspective—the early
experiences with first-generation abdominal aortic aneurysm
stent grafts being an example of the latter and the recent
experiences with transcatheter aortic valve replacement
(TAVR) devices appear to be emerging examples of the for-
mer. Regardless of the perspective, one fact remains indisput-
able: the discordant regulatory thresholds for medical devices
to enter the market in countries around the world continue to
provide financial and logistical challenges to the organizations
trying to develop and make available new lifesaving and life-
altering technologies to physicians and patients. It also poten-
tially creates challenges for patients moving from one regula-
tory region to another.
To further complicate the tapestry of regulatory require-
ments around the world, the impact of individual country
regulatory requirements can have dramatic implications to
the availability of new devices. In the medical devices
space, this is manifested in the requirement that devices be
subjected to localized versions of international performance
standards—essentially requiring that the same type of test-
ing be repeated to support local approval of the technology.
Of greater impact is the growing insistence by regulators
that clinical trials (premarket and/or post-market) be con-
ducted either in whole or in part within a particular country.
When one considers the growing number of regions (Brazil,
Japan, India, and China) in which local requirements are
emerging, the cost implications to manufacturers (and thus
their ability to market their devices globally) are staggering.
While there may be a rationale for testing pharmaceuticals
in genetically diverse populations, clinical trials with cardiac
rhythm management (CRM) devices in multiple countries
has less merit, and rarely can these trials be statistically
powered to truly answer implicit concern of geographically
diverse response to therapy as the number of devices
implanted in many of these countries, even post market, is
often too low.
Industry representatives and regulators from countries
around the world have met through the Global Harmonization
Task Force (GHTF) in an effort to bring some modicum of
harmony to the standards and requirements across the globe
[10]. Despite tremendous effort and engagement from multiple
stakeholders from around the world, there remains much to do
if we are to inject a level of consistency, which materially
impacts the consistency and global availability of impactful
newmedical technologies. The impacts of recent changesmade
to the organization of GHTF (renamed to IMDRF—
International Medical Device Regulators’ Forum) remain to
be seen.
3 The US regulatory framework and innovation
It would be impossible to proceed without addressing the grow-
ing perception by many key stakeholders (including industry
and physicians) that FDA has become a barrier to medical
device innovation and—either by action or inaction—is driving
innovation outside of the USA. To explore this thesis, it is
important to consider the foundations of the current regulatory
process in the US. Congress writes acts, which the President
signs into law, and which federal agencies, such as the FDA,
interpret and write regulations, and which are available for a
comment period prior to implementation. FDA regulations are
contained in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations [11,
12]. Specifically, the regulations represent FDA’s interpretation
of what the law (Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act) tells
them to do, and guidance documentsmay bewritten by the FDA
to aid the public to comply with the intent of the regulations. It is
premature for the authors to comment at this time on the
practical impact of the recent Food and Drug Administration
Safety and Innovation Act of July 2012, which includes the
Medical Device Fees Act (MDUFA III) for the next 5 years [13].
Although there have been few changes in either the law or
regulations which define the manner in which medical devices
are to be regulated in the USA, there is the persistent belief the
requirements have significantly changed.
To appreciate how this might be so, one can look at the
regulatory standard for market entry—“reasonable assurance
of safety and effectiveness.” While simple in concept, the
vagueness of this standard is embodied in that which consti-
tutes “reasonable assurance” as defined by the expectations of
the American public and as reflected by the actions of their
representatives in government. Although the medical devices
developed in this country have grown ever more complex to
treat an ever increasingly complex set of patient conditions,
there has been a seemingly simultaneous increase of expect-
ations from the American public (and their representatives) of
the reliability and safety of these same devices. In so doing,
we have in essence shifted the definition of “reasonable as-
surance” in a direction which demands that the level of assur-
ance that is “reasonable” is higher today than it was several
years ago. Said differently, the American public has expressed
a lowered threshold of risk they are willing to accept for a
particular patient benefit in even the newest of technologies
which treats the sickest of patients (one need only review the
record of Congressional hearings during the past 3 years for
evidence of this shift) [4]. In response to this, regulators have
in essence “raised the bar” on the level of pre-market data
(bench top, animal, and clinical) and post-market studies
required for the approval of medical devices in the USA.
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Approval in the European Union is based primarily on thor-
ough bench testing, engineering analysis, and post-market
clinical data. However, while this used to be similar in the
USA, the pre-market and post-market clinical requirements
have increased in the last 10 years in the USA. For example, a
US implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) lead approval
pre-market patient study has gone from 24 patient-years in
1998 to about 400 patient-years in 2008, and currently in 2012
to 1,000 patient-years, a 40-fold increase (Fig. 1). In addition,
in 2008, a post-approval study was added for about 1,800
patients enrolled with 5-year follow-up on 1,000. With a
device sales life of 3–5 years, this represents a significant
enough increase on the cost to obtain US market approval
compared to European approval, to make commercialization
of some devices unattractive in the USA (manufacturer data).
One may question whether CRM device reliability is wors-
ening and necessitates this increased scrutiny. Defining device
quality and reliability may be challenging as there are many
potential measures, with each measure subject to variation
unrelated to device. Maisel and colleagues [14] suggested that
while pacemaker malfunctions had declined during the period
of 1990–2001, ICD malfunctions had not declined. While
those data were applicable to that time period, it should be
considered that ICD therapy was in its infancy (FDA approval
5 years earlier 1985), and that time period saw the evolution of
the ICD from a shock device to one with dual-chamber pacing
and anti-tachycardia pacing. In contrast, pacemakers were at
that time already a relatively mature technology. Maisel et al.
[14] observed the malfunction rate for ICDs to be in the range
of 1–4 %. Current ICDs appear to have fewer malfunctions, as
reported by manufacturers’ product performance reports, in
the range of 1 % at 5 years, despite improved device internal
diagnostics to identify malfunction. A recent FDA study from
2003 to 2007 used annualized ICD and CRT-D explantation
rates (AER) as an estimate of device reliability and malfunc-
tion. They concluded that in this more recent time period,
there had been a favorable decline in the AER (p<0.001),
which might suggest that there is less device malfunction [15].
This decline is all the more significant when one considers the
improved diagnostic capabilities of today’s ICDs which allow
the differentiation, for example, of normal battery depletion
from component malfunction.
While this shift in standard may ultimately increase the
safety and reliability of first-generation devices introduced
in the USA, we are currently witnessing a decided shift of
medical device manufacturers to focus their development
and approval efforts either initially or exclusively to regions
outside the USA [9]. While US approval often represents the
de facto “gold standard” and provides great assurance to
many, the cost to reach this objective has become increas-
ingly prohibitive for many innovators. Thus, it is not unrea-
sonable to project that access to new technologies in the
USA will increasingly lag (perhaps by many years) the
availability of these technologies outside the USA. While
tempting to demonize the FDA as the cause of this shift, it is
more likely that the agency and its leadership are not the
cause of this, but are in many ways reacting to what the
American public (and Government) is asking of them. In
fact, the authors have found the FDA to be very helpful in
working within this restrictive government policy frame-
work, to collaboratively arrive at a trial design expected to
meet the regulatory requirements and best serve patients.
Although challenging, there are signs that all is not lost.
There seems now to be a growing recognition by govern-
ment officials that the shifts in expectations are driving
innovative medical technology (and the people that develop
them) outside of the USA. The FDA has recently published
new and revised Guidance documents which speak of their
expectations for conducting feasibility clinical studies in the
USA and the expectations and methodologies related to the
assessment of risks and benefits [16].
It is this latter topic (risk and benefits) which will ultimately
define the intersection of medical device regulation and inno-
vation in this country. For one of the foundations of medical
product law is the premise that no medical product—either
drug or device—is without risk. The degree of risk we are
willing to accept for a given benefit will ultimately define the
breadth and type of pre-market evaluation (and the results)
that must be completed before a product can enter the market.
Finally, incorporated into this analysis must be an honest
discourse about the adoption of new medical technologies
by the physician community. With each new innovative
medical technology, there seems to be a predictable cycle
of cautious adoption within the approved patient indications
until comfortable with the technology. Once comfort has
been attained, this is often followed by over-adoption,
sometimes outside the approved (and studied) patient pop-
ulations. This inevitable unbridled optimism driven by con-
fidence in the technology (rather than assurance in the data)
certainly feeds into the argument that more pre-market data
Fig. 1 Pre-market clinical testing required for FDA approval of ICD
leads for one manufacturer, expressed in patient-years. This demon-
strates an increase in the time and number of patients needed for study
after 2007 (internal data, but available at the FDA)
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collection (not less) is necessary to ensure patient safety.
However, ultimately, physician bodies will need to deter-
mine appropriate device indications based on the greater
experience post-market approval, potentially through guide-
lines. It should also be considered that off-label pharmaceu-
tical use has led to some important discoveries such as beta
blockers for heart failure, or ASA for stroke prevention. It is
certainly possible that similar discoveries might occur later
in the device area also.
Another component of regulatory oversight involves
post-market surveillance and actions taken by manufacturers
with fielded products. In the past decade, there have been
many product field actions in the CRM area despite the
largely unrecognized fact that performance of these devices
(in terms of reliability and safety) has actually improved.
Manufacturers typically execute these field actions volun-
tarily to reduce the risk of patient harm when either (1) a
new and previously unrecognized hazard associated with the
device or its use has emerged or (2) a hazard has emerged
with a greater frequency or harm than previously recognized
or expected. Manufacturers typically become aware of these
malfunction events through physician and patient com-
plaints captured and analyzed in their post-market surveil-
lance systems. The apparent paradox of more advisories
despite improving overall performance is consistent with a
lower tolerance of malfunctions at multiple levels. Thus, a
recent study of 1,644 consecutive ICD implants between
1996 and 2004 revealed that 704 patients(43 %) were part of
an advisory, but only 28 of 1,644 patients (1.7 %) actually
had an advisory-related device malfunction, and Class I
recalls were not associated with increased mortality [17].
Some patients did undergo device replacement (42/1,644,
2.5 %) and hence were harmed, but it should also be consid-
ered that ultimately, if the patient does not succumb to comor-
bidities, that most ICDs need to be replaced and that this is a
fractional harm depending on the device age when replaced.
Field actions taken by a manufacturer are often very
expensive and come with an attendant amount of attention,
publicity, and legal action. While this attention provides
significant opportunities to inform physicians and patients, it
often leads to fear and—sometimes—inappropriate actions.
Significantly, some field actions have been for malfunctions
that are uncommon and occur in products with an overall
performance that is considered acceptable [18]. In 2004,
Maisel [19] found that many physicians would explant a
pacemaker if it had a malfunction rate of 1/10,000, which is
notably a better overall performance than any known pace-
maker has ever demonstrated. There may now be a better
physician understanding of the risks of device explantation.
However, recently, when physicians have been faced with a
situation where one of their patients has experienced a
1/10,000 sporadic component malfunction, we have observed
that sometimes there is still an initial physician response to
want to explant all similar devices from their patients or to
take special unnecessary precautions. In short, it appears that
patient and physician expectations for the performance of
CRM devices may have outstripped engineering capability,
and this potentially leads to both patients and physicians
failing to utilize beneficial device therapy or creating, second-
arily through physician actions, more patient harm than the
original device hazard [20].While it is clear that the onus is on
the industry to meet today’s standards and expectations, it is
also clear that those standards and expectations are becoming
more stringent. A high profile example of this is an ICD lead
recall from 2007 (6-year lead survival, 84.8 %). While that
same manufacturer had a better immediately precedent prod-
uct, the ICD lead made by the same manufacturer in the late
1990s had a similar malfunction rate (6-year lead survival,
86.8 %), and the product from the 1990s was not subject to
any regulatory action because it met the performance expect-
ations of a decade earlier. It must also be recognized that the
lead recalled in 2007 was likely designed in around 2000,
when the performance expectations were different [21].
An appropriately designed post-market surveillance pro-
gram by medical device manufacturers, which captures unex-
pected hazards as well as appropriate device performance, is
necessary to ensure the continued availability of medical
devices in the USA. When performance does not meet regu-
latory expectations, executing a worldwide field action may
cost a manufacturer over 50 million dollars, excluding the
secondary loss of future business, and/or legal costs which
are often far more. This fact has a potential significant effect
on innovative technology. Manufacturers now must consider
not only approval of a device but also the potential post-
market quality/regulatory risks any new innovative device
may pose over time. Thus, some manufacturers chose to
deliberately avoid the development of products with the great-
est regulatory or liability risks. Although the US Supreme
Court ruled that in Riegel v. Medtronic a medical device
manufacturer cannot be sued under state law by patients
alleging harm from a device that received marketing approval
from the FDA, this does not end all legal actions, which also
continue to be a significant cost to manufacturers, particularly
in the USA. Thus, the post-market regulatory environment in
the USA provides several significant disincentives to innova-
tive technology. Consistent with this, there has been a steady
decline in both 510(k) and PMA submissions to the FDA
(Fig. 2) [22, 23]. This suggests that the current environment
has already potentially significantly negatively impacted med-
ical innovation despite the advances in genomics, nanotech-
nology, and computing power. However, there are also other
significant non-regulatory disincentives currently to medical
device innovation, particularly in the USA. These include the
economic situation which has reduced available venture cap-
ital, concerns about the medical device excise tax, the pro-
jected reductions in health care spending as a disincentive as it
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is difficult to project future return on investment, the chal-
lenges to creating industry–university partnerships currently,
the disconnect between FDA approval and reimbursement,
the mounting costs of clinical trials in the USA, patient con-
cerns about investigational devices, and insurance payers’
reluctance to reimburse for investigational therapy. Thus, even
innovative novel therapy such as the subcutaneous ICD faces
significant time and financial hurdles.
4 Beyond safety and efficacy: implications
of comparative effectiveness research on medical devices
Comparative effectiveness research (CER) has been touted as
one of the key tools of policy makers to lower costs and
improve patient outcomes. While the term is broad and can
encompass a range of concepts, for our purposes, we can
define CER as research comparing patient outcomes and risks
and benefits between two or more therapies or devices. Policy
makers expect payers, physicians, and patients to use infor-
mation generated by CER when making clinical and health
care choices. Specifically, that information about the relative
risks and benefits of therapies will cut down on unnecessary
care, increase the use of more effective therapies, and lower
costs. In short, CER has the potential to do much good, but
much depends on how the information is generated and used.
The implications, for patients, physicians, and the medical
device industry, are considerable.
The concept of comparative effectiveness is not new.
Health technology assessment, for example, has taken place
since at least the early 1970s in the USA and other countries.
For example, the Office of Technology Assessment was
established in 1972 as a Congressional agency to provide
advice to Congress on the “early indications of the probably
beneficial and adverse impacts of technology and to develop
other coordinate information which may assist Congress”
(Public Law 92-484). One of its earliest reports was on the
assessment of cancer-testing technology and saccharin is-
sued in 1977. In the last year of its existence, the OTA
issued CER reports on the cost effectiveness of prostate
cancer screening in elderly men and the effectiveness and
costs of osteoporosis screening and hormone replacement
therapy [24].
In 2010, with the enactment of the Accountable Care Act,
the federal government created the Patient-Centered
Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) whose mission is to
help “people make informed health care decisions, and
improve[s] health care delivery and outcomes, by producing
and promoting high integrity, evidence-based information that
comes from research guided by patients, caregivers and the
broader health care community.” PCORI funding was US
$150 million for fiscal year 2012 [25]. Needless to say, this
represents a small fraction of government expenditures on
health care research (as the NIH invests US $30.9 billion
annually in medical research) [26]. PCORI is not the only
federal entity active in CER. The Agency for Health Care
Quality and Research undertakes CER-like activities (e.g.,
technology assessments), frequently at the request of the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). States
are also actively considering or conducting CER, with the
State of Washington’s Health Technology Assessment pro-
gram being the most visible and notable example. Perhaps the
best-known agency is the United Kingdom National Institute
for Clinical and Health Excellence (NICE), which conducts
CER and disseminates its findings to patient, clinicians, pur-
chasers of care, and others to inform decision making. Other
organizations, such as the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Technology Evaluation Center, and private payers also engage
in technology assessment for use in making coverage deci-
sions. Health technology assessment is actively performed in
France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Australia, with other
countries actively considering establishing similar programs
(South Korea and Japan, for example).
Industry supports CER, provided the focus is on the
clinical appropriateness of alternative treatments, and the
research agenda and related questions are shaped with input
from multiple stakeholders, including physician specialty
societies and medical device companies. To be most effec-
tive, conducting CER and interpreting results in the context
of medical devices, policy makers, physicians, and
Fig. 2 Progressive declines in
510(k) and PMA submissions
to the FDA between 1999 and
2009. Reproduced from [22]
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purchasers should be cognizant of several factors that can
influence CER findings.
Perhaps the most important factor is the time frame consid-
ered when studying implantable medical device interventions.
For interventions that act continuously over time, as is the case
formany implantable devices, the magnitude of clinical benefit
increases with time. Thus, the benefit from the device increases
with time and the number of patients needed to treat to save a
life, for example, diminishes with longer follow-up. Table 1
shows the effect of varying follow-up duration on the number
needed to treat to save a life with ICDs [27], and this is graphed
in Fig. 3. Thus, a key question for those designing clinical
studies is the length of follow-up. If it is too short, a CER
review could result in an unfavorable conclusion. Lengthening
the follow-up time, however, has consequences. The sponsor,
frequently medical device companies, will incur higher costs.
And importantly for patients, physicians, and company spon-
sors, depending on the study design, a longer follow-up could
increase the time to market and prevent the technology from
being available to patients quickly. In the past, CRM device
manufacturers have tended to focus on the comparison of
device versus optimal pharmaceutical therapy for the preven-
tion of sudden death or treatment of heart failure, with the
measured outcomes focused on mortality, heart failure hospi-
talization, and, more recently, on economic endpoints. In the
future, it may be necessary to focus on other outcomes and
other comparative treatment strategies.
Time also plays an important role with respect to cost
effectiveness reviews. Using the example in the table, making
conclusions about the relative benefit of an ICD implant at
1 year will yield different conclusions than when making
conclusion 3 years after implant because of the up-front costs
of the device and surgical implantation. The same issue must
be considered when assessing the cost effectiveness of thera-
pies. For example, the cost effectiveness of ICD therapies can
range from about US $150,000 to US $300,000 at 3 years, but
drop substantially to about US $50,000–100,000 over a life-
time. Using a lifetime frame as the basis of evaluation yields a
more appropriate understanding of the value of ICD therapies
as, in general, ICD implantation is a lifelong treatment strat-
egy, and MADIT II 8-year follow-up, for example, shows
continuing benefit to the therapy over that extended time
period [28]. However, over increasing time, there may emerge
new comorbidities which can also affect outcomes not influ-
enced by an ICD. Thus, consideration needs to be given to
potential changing effectiveness of the device over time. An
examination of the potential impact of comorbidities on the
mortality of an initial implant ICD population was recently
published [29], and this type of analysis may need to be
considered over time, for example, with each subsequent
device replacement.
A second important factor to consider is the evolutionary
nature of medical device innovation. Medical device interven-
tions frequently require time to evolve. Continuous evolution
and improvement in the technology, procedure techniques, and
physician skill will influence clinical outcomes and thus, in
many cases, affect patient outcomes. As with the follow-up
time, the evolutionary nature of medical device innovation
Table 1 Individual trial data
demonstrating the impact of fol-
low-up time on observed benefit
(life-years gained per device
implanted) and on observed
number needed to treat to gain 1
life-year
Reproduced from [15]
Trial Life-years gained per
device implanted
Size of number needed to
treat to gain 1 life-year
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Wever et al. [35] 0.10 0.30 0.58 10 3.3 1.7
MADIT [36] 0.11 0.30 0.50 9 3.3 2.0
AVID [37] 0.05 0.12 0.22 21 8 4.6
CIDS [38] 0.01 0.04 0.09 123 24 11
MADIT II [39] 0.01 0.06 0.13 133 17 8
CASH [40] 0.01 0.09 0.18 133 11 5.6
Schläpfer et al. [41] 0.07 0.23 0.41 15 4.4 2.5
MUSTT [42] 0.07 0.21 0.40 15 4.7 2.5
Fig. 3 Cost effectiveness ICD versus control over lifetime in 2005 US
dollars
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must be considered both by trial sponsors as well as in the
interpretation of results under CER. For example, the safety
and efficacy endpoints for a particular left atrial occlusion
device improved significantly over the course of just a few
years with physician experience [30]. Furthermore, during the
time course of a long-term CER, the medical device being
assessed has often undergone production of new generations of
products associated with improved outcomes. The challenge
for policy makers is to balance between “too early to be
evaluated appropriately” and such widespread dissemination
that changing clinical practice is challenging even with an
unfavorable finding of effectiveness. For example, the United
States Preventive Services Task Force generated substantial
controversy in October 2011 with its draft recommendation
against PSA-based screening for prostate cancer. The recom-
mendation was based on an update to a 2008 evidence synthe-
sis which concluded that the evidence was insufficient to
assess the balance of benefits and harms in men <75 years of
age. The challenge for physicians, payers, and patients is that
while the evidence was being generated, the use of PST-based
screening becamewidespread, with over half of Americanmen
over 50 years of age receiving the test. A favorable recommen-
dation is not a guarantee that clinical practice will change
either. For example, despite the depth and quality of clinical
data and a relatively favorable NICE guidance, ICD therapy
use remains underutilized in England and Wales [31, 32].
A related challenge for CER will be to keep evidence
reviews and technology assessments updated as technology
evolves and clinical guidelines change. Policy makers and
those conducing CER must balance resources between the
need for evidence in virtually all clinical, therapeutic, and
health care delivery spaces with the need to update existing
research to keep pace with innovation. For example, while
technology and clinical guidelines have changed with re-
spect to cardiac resynchronization therapy, many coverage
policies in the USA and NICE guidance remain unchanged
(NICE is in the process of reviewing its guidance on ICD
and CRT-Ds and expects to issue revised guidance in late
2013). Physicians and purchasers will have to consider the
age of CER assessments with more current clinical data and
clinical guidelines when making clinical choices and cover-
age decisions. Physicians will also have to consider that the
rapid evolution in devices will mean that CER (and some-
times clinical guidelines) is based on technology that is
several generations older than currently available.
The cycle of innovation and interaction with CER and
guidelines may also require device companies to develop a
range of post-market research strategies to ensure that the
available data are consistent with later generations of tech-
nology. Payers will also undoubtedly use CER to inform
coverage requirements. For example, CMS’s recent decision
to cover TAVR for Medicare patients will require hospitals
and physicians to participate in a national registry that will
follow patients for at least 1 year and answer specific ques-
tions on patient outcomes (e.g., stroke, mortality, etc.) and
quality of life. Collecting and disseminating such data will
increase costs for physicians, hospitals, and medical device
companies. However, the rationale for such registries is in
part based on the need to monitor the performance of com-
plex devices in non-investigative centers [33].
Other factors to consider when designing comparative clin-
ical studies and interpreting CER reviews are the patient pop-
ulation studied and the number of patients being studied.
Clinical trials, by their nature, study average effects in large
populations. Yet, when it comes to our own health, none of us
are interested in what works best for the average patient—we
all want to know what works best for the individual patient we
are caring for at a given point in time. Making sure that
comparative clinical studies are large enough to conduct mean-
ingful subgroup analyses is therefore important. A good exam-
ple comes from the MADIT-CRT Study. This trial—looking at
the effect of cardiac resynchronization therapy in patients with
minimally symptomatic congestive heart failure—met its pri-
mary endpoint for the entire population studied. However,
subgroup analysis revealed a marked difference in outcome
according to the presence or absence of left bundle branch
block (Fig. 4). A CER review using the group average would
understate the effect in the patients with left bundle branch
block while overstating the effect in the remainder. Subgroup
analysis may become particularly important in view of the
Fig. 4 MADIT-CRT post hoc analysis of left bundle branch block. It
was subsequently discovered and validated that in the LBBB subgroup,
patients received substantial benefit from CRT-D. Non-LBBB patients
did not show evidence of benefit. The LBBB subgroup made up
approximately 70 % of the total MADIT-CRT population (adapted
from Boston Scientific CRT-D product labeling)
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ongoing genomic revolution and the trend toward personalized
medicine—in the coming world, we may each comprise our
own subgroup of one!
On the positive side, large-scale registries such as the
ACC/NCDR ICD registry may provide long-term data for
the analysis of outcomes [29]. These registries may provide
a more cost-effective method for assessing the comparative
effectiveness of therapies, particularly when coupled to re-
mote patient monitoring. Unfortunately, this method does
not provide an approach to assessing outcomes in an alter-
native treatment group.
Finally, an important question, again related to time, will be
when to stop. When do policy makers and physicians deter-
mine that we have “enough” information? Without “stopping
rules” for CER similar to those found in clinical studies, we
run the risk of placing societal resources into efforts with ever
diminishing marginal benefits. For example, is there a pro-
spective plan of when to end the ACC/NCDR ICD registry?
Unfortunately, stopping times will vary with each device type
and will be particularly difficult to determine for innovative
therapy, and there is a significant risk that pharmacologic
principles may be inappropriately applied to devices.
Particularly concerning is a recent publication by Chen et al.
[34] which argues in favor of the “inclusion of comparative
effectiveness data in high-risk cardiovascular device studies at
the time of premarket approval.” The implantable defibrillator,
which represented innovative therapy in 1985, did not have a
randomized comparator, and it required thoracotomy for lead
and patch placement, and it is unclear whether it would have
met this criteria for approval. However, clearly subsequent
iterations of the ICD have demonstrated CER benefit, but
without original approval, this benefit may never have been
achieved. Similarly, the subcutaneous ICD did not have a
randomized comparator group, but it is our opinion that this
approach to pre-market CER would have been entirely inap-
propriate and significantly raised the regulatory burden to the
point of potentially excluding beneficial therapy for high-risk
cardiovascular patients for many of the previously cited rea-
sons. The S-ICD which was approved by the FDA is a first-
generation device which will rapidly be redesigned; physi-
cians are currently unfamiliar with implantation techniques,
and there will inevitably be a learning process for appropriate
use. CER has a role later when there is stability of the device
design, physician knowledge, and patient selection.
4.1 Summary and a path forward
The last half century has seen unprecedented improvements in
health care with declines in cardiovascular deaths, due in part
to the introduction of a series of revolutionary new medical
technologies. Nevertheless, current circumstances pose signif-
icant hurdles to continuing medical device innovation: the
regulatory environment is globally fragmented and currently
particularly burdensome in the USA. We have a clear need for
good comparative effectiveness data for new technologies, but
there are particular issues with designing comparative clinical
trials and interpreting CER assessments in the context of new
medical devices. There clearly are very divergent views on
this topic, and undoubtedly, there are even divergent views
within industry. However, we believe that there are potential
paths to maintain and improve innovation, as seen from our
industry viewpoint:
Industry:
1. Greater care is needed in planning innovative products
that meet today’s health care needs. Where there is
change, there is also new opportunity (e.g., reducing
30-day re-hospitalization for heart failure).
2. Product cadence should be coupled to available outcomes
data (e.g., a new feature in a medical device should be
planned to be submitted for approval shortly after there is
beneficial clinical data to support that feature).
3. Developing and expanding methods such as remote
patient monitoring to reduce the cost for CER and
potentially to improve analysis of patient outcomes
and device performance
4. Making more cost-effective devices. For example, a
longer lasting device results in a lower cost over the
long term. Market drivers in low- and middle-income
nations bring this to a higher priority for industry.
5. Less invasive alternative innovative therapies not only may
reduce costs by avoiding surgical procedures but may also
reduce the costs related to surgical complications.
6. Researching the currently unmet needs in health care
today (e.g., disease processes with disproportionate ex-
penditure or poor outcomes currently such as heart
failure with preserved ejection fraction)
7. Improved device reliability to reduce costs related to
device malfunctions (e.g., current focus in CRM is on
lead reliability)
8. Co-sponsored CERwith government, other manufacturers,
and include active participation from physician bodies
9. Develop genotypic or biomarker-based device indica-
tions with improved cost/benefit ratio
Physicians:
1. Set appropriate expectations amongst physicians, regu-
lators, and patients about what realistic device perfor-
mance should be and set up forums to publicly share
this with industry. Physicians are encouraged to volun-
teer for advisory roles with FDA, CMS, and other
payers and to express concern when they believe that
regulatory barriers are excessive.
2. Physicians and industry need to disseminate under-
standing of the tensions between novel designs and
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reliability. Thus, when a physician requests a smaller F
size lead, which may be easier to place in the patient, the
industry design compromises may lead to potentially
greater malfunction rates. In the case of an ICD lead,
the net clinical effect has sometimes been suboptimal.
In contrast, reducing the size of left ventricular coronary
venous leads to 4 F has enhanced the usability signifi-
cantly, but it is as yet unclear if there is a reliability
trade-off in lead life. Similar compromises between
functionality and reliability often apply to more com-
plex device feature sets. Programming higher tachycar-
dia detection rates may reduce inappropriate shocks
from an ICD and may be beneficial, but in extremes
may result in failure to detect ventricular fibrillation
with low rates at the RV electrode.
3. There is a tendency by multiple parties to lay blame
when device performance is not as expected in the long
term. That is, when the manufacturer has performed the
appropriate testing, consistent with engineering knowl-
edge in place at the time of development, and that
testing satisfies regulatory requirements, it is hard to
know whether there is fault if the performance is sub-
optimal in the long term. Stated in other words, it is
difficult to test for unknown failure mechanisms and
mitigate unknowns, particularly in novel products and
design. All parties need to consider how to address and
educate on this, and physician bodies may choose to
consider the malfunction rates found in post-approval
studies when updating therapy guidelines.
4. Understanding the potential trade-off in design versus
new features such as magnetic resonance conditional
safety is important for physicians (e.g., devices do not
sense during the scan, long-term confusion among non-
device following physicians about which patients are
conditionally safe).
5. In dealing with devices with less than optimal perfor-
mance, physician bodies need to carefully consider the
risks of intervention and compare that with the risks of
non-intervention in developing recommendations.
6. Physicians need to be vigilant for device malfunctions
and report to both the FDA and the manufacturer.
Returning products for manufacturer analysis where
there is concern is important.
Government (legislative and regulatory bodies):
1. Efforts to produce regulatory convergence across borders
2. Consider reviewing the regulatory burden for device
approvals. The FDA does have a fast pathway for
innovative therapy with unmet health care need.
However, even this pathway has a significant cost, as
seen with the recent S-ICD development which took
over a decade and cost in excess of 400 million dollars.
3. Maintain consistent expectations for product perfor-
mance consistent with device design reality
4. Educate the public on the expected performance that is
considered acceptable
5. Consider the use of less burdensome remote follow-up
device data coupled to CMS or NCDR data to satisfy
the post-market surveillance needs
6. Develop innovative payment policies to enable savings
gained by one stakeholder using innovative technolo-
gies to be shared with other stakeholders
7. Develop an understanding that processes used in
monitoring pharmaceuticals sold to millions of
patients over a decade are difficult to apply to devi-
ces that are often sold in numbers <100,000 for 2–
3 years for individual models
8. Provide incentives for greater cost effectiveness. For
example, greater battery longevity is usually associat-
ed with larger device size, which is not popular with
physicians or patients. The manufacturer potentially
may lose money because of fewer generator replace-
ments. The major beneficiary of this technology is the
health care payer, but currently, they do not provide
incentives for longevity.
9. Provide for reimbursement during an interim period
after the development of a novel medical technol-
ogy, such that the technology might be optimally
explored and experience gained, before definitive
CER studies are done. While this may exist in
CPT coding, CMS may not always rule in concert
with FDA approval.
10. A practical delineation of appropriate physician–indus-
try collaboration to produce optimal future devices
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